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This  paper describes a bold effort by the Rio de Janeiro State Government to
increase private sector participation, reduce operating subsidies and set the
foundations for  long-term sustainability of its urban transport sector. This effort
was undertaken with the help of three World Bank-financed loans: The Rio de
Janeiro Metropolitan  Transport Decentralization loan, which assisted in the
transfer offederally-owned  suburban railways to the State Government; the Rio
de Janeiro State Reform and Privatization loan, which assisted the State in the
privatization and concessioning of a number of its enterprises; and the Rio de
Janeiro Mass  Transit loan,  which supported the reorganization of the sector
and the concession of the Rio suburban raihvays (Flumitrens). Most of the
urban transport sector reforms have been implemented  The lessons learned
from  the implementation process adopted by the State as well as the results
obtained so far suggest that  political decisiveness, transparency, and ingenuity
in devising incentives are key to privatizing urban rail transport systems. But
they also show that not having a credible staff redundancy program may
seriously reduce the benefits expectedfrom  the concessions.
URBAN TRANSIT PROBLEMS  IN THE  RIO DE JANEIRO METROPOLITAN
REGION
1.  The Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region (RJMR) comprises 546,865 hectares and 9.8
million inhabitants, spread irregularly over 19 separate municipalities.  It is dominated
by the Rio de Janeiro municipality,  with 5.7 million  inhabitants. Within the
metropolitan region roughly 76 percent of the population lives on just  15 percent of
the territory.
2.  The Rio de Janeiro municipality  alone accounts for 56 percent of the population of the
State and 77 percent of the income of the metropolitan area. It employs 4.5 million
people and generates roughly 85 percent of the city's income.
Buses and Cars Account for Too Large a Proportion of Total Trips Made
3.  Every day 13 million person trips are made in the metropolitan region, of which 40
percent are home-to-work commutes. Sixty-seven percent of all trips are by public
transport, 11 percent are by automobile, 20 percent are by foot, and 2 percent are by
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the data provided.other modes. Of the 8.7 million  trips a year made on public  transportation,  77 percent
are by bus (most of which  are run by private operators), 14.5  percent by automobile,
4 percent by suburban  train (Flumitrens,  formerly  CBTU-RJ),  3 percent by subway
(Metro), 1 percent  by ferry (CONERJ),  and 0.5 percent  by other modes.  About  half of
all public  transport trips involve  transfers  (47 percent of all train trips,  41 percent of all
bus trips, and 37 percent  of all Metro trips).
4.  Lack of integration  between  the 23-kilometer  long Metro and the 264-kilometer  rail
network  discourages  more rail trips. As a result,  buses and automobile  are used,
creating  heavy  congestion  during  peak hours and significantly  increasing  commuting
time.  It is estimated  that each carioca (inhabitant  of Rio) wastes 10-15  days a year
because  of high  traffic  congestion.
5.  The problem  is exacerbated  by Rio's many  hills  and tunnels,  which  make  it vulnerable
to traffic  congestion,  especially  when accidents  occur or cars break down. The fact
that there is limited  space  for fully  segregated  busways  also contributes  to bus
congestion.
Poor People  Bear a Disproportionate  Share  of the Burden  of Inadequate  Mass
Transit
6.  The main  users of the public  transport system  are from the Baixada  Fluminense,  one
of the lowest-income  areas of the RJMR. These  users suffer  from a shortage  of
capacity  at peak hours that causes  severe  overcrowding  (more than 10 passengers  per
square  kilometer).  They  spend more  than a fourth of their personal  income  on transit
fares and endure  long commutes  (2.5-4  hours a day)  that often require  multiple
transfers.
Excessive  Congestion  Adversely  Affects  the Environment
7.  In 1994, 1.7 million  vehicles  were registered  in the Rio de Janeiro  metropolitan  region.
These  vehicles  have degraded  the city's air quality  by increasing  the levels of carbon
monoxide,  ozone, and particulate  matter.  The problem  is particularly  acute  in tunnels,
which  are poorly  ventilated.  Although  vehicular  air pollution  has been somewhat
mitigated  by the use of by use of alcohol  the problem  remains  severe.  Vehicular
accidents  have  become  a major source of environmental  risk  in Rio de Janeiro.
Congestion  and overcrowding  of the public  transport  system  also contribute  to
environmental  stress,  prompting  trampling  and fights.
8.  Lack of coordination  between  the three levels  of government  responsible  for urban
transport,  particularly  between  the State and the municipality  of Rio de Janeiro,  led to
poor tariff and modal  integration,  lack of prioritization  in urban transport  investments,
and  the absence  of a common  policy  on pricing  and subsidies.  With the exception  of
one state-owned  company  (CTC), in 1995-96  all bus services  were provided  by private
operators,  which  do not receive  direct subsidies.  In contrast,  Flumitrens  received
US$180  million  in subsidies,  Metro US$109  million,  and CONERJ  US$30 million  in
1995  (at the start of the reform  program).
2INSTrrUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
9.  Urban  transport responsibilities  within  a municipality  fall under  the jurisdiction  of the
municipality's  prefeitura (mayor's  office).  Metropolitan  transport  (in most cases,
urban transport  involving  more  than one municipality  ) is under  the jurisdiction  of the
state. The State Secretary  of Transport  (SECTRAN)  oversees  Flumitrens  (suburban
rail), Metro (subway),  CTC/SERVE  (bus), CONERJ  (ferries),  and CODERTE
(terminals),  all of which are owned  by the State. Table 1 summarizes  the basic  data for
these state-owned  companies  in 1995,  i.e., at the start of the reforms;  and Annex  1
describes  each of them in more detail.  Urban  transport in the municipality  of Rio de
Janeiro  falls  under the jurisdiction  of the municipal  Secretary  of Transport,  who
oversees  mainly  buses  (all of which  are private)  and traffic  management
Table 1
Name  of  Mode  Number  of  Annual  Annual  Annual  Annual  Subsidy
Company  employees  number  of  Revenues  Payroll  Operating  per
passengers  (millions  Cost  Subsidy  passenger
(millions)  us$)  (millions  (millions  (us$/pas)
____________  _____________  ___________  ~~~~us$)  us$)
Flumitrens  Suburban  rail  7871  93  34  180  180  1.94
Metro  Subway  3272  97.2  31  111  109  1.12
Coneri  Ferry  boats  1097  24  11  28  30  1.25
CTC/SERVE  Buses  2496  26.6  13  30  37  1.39
Coderte  Terminals  695  na  13  7  (1)  n.a
Total  I  _  _  15431  240.8  102  356  355  1.48
Values  are  for 1  995,at  the  start  of the  reforrn  program
10.  Problems  with the urban  transport system  and the very high subsidies  paid to support
operating  deficits  in the sector  prompted  the State administration,  which  took over in
January  1995,  to establish  improving  metropolitan  transport as one of its main
priorities.  Specific  goals  included  extending  the Metro (subway  system),  construction
of which  was halted  in 1987;  transforming  the Flumitrens  rail system  into a modem
Metro-like  operation;  increasing  the participation  of the private sector in the operation
and investment  of all urban  transport systems;  and introducing  policies  that would
promote  the use of urban  transport.  Rio de Janeiro  approached  the Bank for a loan to
help  reform  the sector and complete  the work started  with the Metropolitan  Transport
Decentralization  loan.
ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE REFORM PROGRAM
11. A number  of key issues  needed  to be addressed  to improve  the supply  of urban
transport services  and to guarantee  their long-term  sustainability.  These  issues
included:
*  Increasing  capacity  and ensuring  safety
*  Addressing  institutional  and regulatory  issues
*  Recovering  costs through  tariffs  and improving  financial  management
*  Targeting  subsidies  at the poor
*  Reducing  environmental  impact
*  Addressing  planning  issues
3*  Increasing  private sector participation  involvement  in investments  and operations
Increasing Capacity and Ensuring Safety
12. The most important  challenge  facing  Rio de Janeiro  was the need  to increase  cost-
efficient  peak hour capacity  in order to guarantee  an acceptable  level of service  to the
average  commuter  under  reasonable  safety  conditions.  This could  be done by
rehabilitating  and restructuring  Flumitrens  and building  new mass transit  systems
(busways,  Light rail transit systems  ; improving  traffic  management;  and reducing
traffic  and transit  accidents  through  a combination  of transit safety  education
campaigns,  law enforcement,  and traffic  engineering.
Addressing Institutional and Regulatory Issues
13. Three important institutional and regulatory issues required attention. First, the
respective roles of state and municipal governments in financing, planning, and
operating urban transport services in accordance with the 1988 Constitution need to
be defined. Second, an entity needed to be created that would be formally empowered
by the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan region to plan, set, and coordinate priorities for
new investments and modal integration in order to ensure a minimum of planning
continuity. Third, appropriate modifications to the regulatory framework needed to be
made. These changes needed to include eliminating  any remaining regulatory barriers
that might prevent free entry or competition in the market for transport services,
especially  bus services.
Recovering Costs through Tariffs and Improving Financial Management
14. The transport sector needed to be operated so that costs were recovered. Specifically,
tariffs needed to be set.so that together with subsidies they covered at least the long-
run variable costs (defined as out-of-pocket costs plus depreciation of equipment and
cost of capital) of the service provided .Fare evasion needed to be controlled. Tariffs
also needed to reflect appropriate peak and off-peak pricing.
15. The huge subsidies paid to the urban transport companies indicated the need to
improve financial management in order to reduce the burden on the State. The mass
transit companies needed to cut costs, eliminate  unnecessary staff, and appoint more
financial managers. Funding mechanisms needed to be revamped in order to ensure
adequate financing for new mass transit systems and the sustainability of the current
systems.
Targeting  Subsidies  at the Poor
16. While the blanket subsidies paid to Rio de Janeiro's mass transit companies needed to
be eliminated, the needs of the poor urban needed to be addressed. Urban households
have been devoting increasingly  large proportions of their incomes to transport, and
transport-related expenditures have come to represent a considerable burden on local
government budgets. In the short term, policymakers needed to address the issue of
targeting urban transport subsidies and extending them to the informal sector that is
4not currently covered by mechanisms such as the vale-transporte 2. Appropriate
mechanisms for financing such subsidies (such as tariff differentiation or contracted
budgetary transfers) and implementing  them (using tokens, multimodal passes, or
differential tariffs) needed to be designed.
Reducing Environmental Impact
17. The environmental impacts of urban congestion and noise pollution in the urban area
needed to be reduced through cleaner and quieter transport systems. Policymakers
needed to assess the potential role of market-based incentives to address pollution. To
the extent possible, they needed to implement the polluter pay principle in order to
minimize the fiscal burden implied by de facto government subsidies to polluters. They
also needed to allocate responsibilities for enforcing the law and defining tougher
standards across government levels. The State Environmental Agency (FEEMA)
needed to be equipped to monitor vehicle emissions and noise.
Addressing Planning Issues
18. Transportation planning needed to be improved. A better traffic data base and traffic
management system needed to be established and a better system adopted for
evaluating new investments, especially the proposed LRT system for the Niter6i-
S.Goncalo link or new Metro extensions. To achieve these objectives, a formal
coordinating agency for urban transport needed to be established in the metropolitan
region.
Increasing Private Sector Participation
19. Private sector participation in Rio de Janeiro's mass transit sector was viewed as a
way of improving the level of service and ensuring that appropriate investments in
extending and maintaining the system were made. Maintenance of the rehabilitated
railway fleet needed to be improved (fleet availability  was down to 58 percent). The
problem of fare evasion -estimated  to cost Flumitrens 30 percent of its revenues-
needed to be dealt with as well.
20. When the Rio de Janeiro State Government administration took office in January
1995, it inherited a very critical financial situation and was almost unable to meet its
payroll in the first months of its mandate. Faced with this scarcity of funds, the
Governor asked all his secretariats to embark on a State Reform and Privatization
program aiming at selling and/or concessioning out  to the private sector  loss-making
state-owned enterprises. The remainder of the paper describes the reforms undertaken
in the urban transport sector which at that time received annual blanket operating
subsidies which amounted to 8-10% of the total State revenues
2  The  vale-transporte  is a targeted  subsidy,  imposed  by  federal  legislation,  by which  every  employer
with more  than 9 employees  must pay the difference  between  home-to-work  transport  costs of
employees  and 6% of their salaries.  The employer  can then deduct  these costs  from its income  tax.
5OBJECTIVES OF THE STATE REFORM PROGRAM
21. Reform  of the urban  transport sector sought  to achieve  three main  objectives:
*  Substantially  reduce  the level  of annual  subsidies  paid  to urban  transport agencies
(estimated  in 1995  at US$363  million,  or 10  percent of State  revenues)  by a
combination  of restructuring and/or sales,  concessions,  or management  contracts  to
the private sector.
*  Improve  the level of service  provided  to users of urban  transport services.
*  Finance  overdue  maintenance,  which  reduced  the capacity  of operating  agencies  to
increase  revenues  and provide  an acceptable  level  of service.
22. The proposed  reforms  focused  on actions  that would  facilitate  administrative  reforms
and restructuring  of the agencies.  The reform  program  also sponsored  studies  to define
the best options  for increased  private  sector participation  in the agencies  and identified
rehabilitation  activities  designed  to boost productivity  of assets that had been
immobilized  because  of lack  of maintenance  funds.
23. Policymakers  expected  to eliminate  subsidies  to Metro, CONERJ,  and CTCISERVE
and to reduce  subsidies  to Flumitrens  to one-third  of their budgeted  1996 level  by the
end of the project. The State also agreed  to introduce  financing  mechanisms  to fund
urban  transport operating  subsidies  while  needed  and to eventually  contribute  toward
future expansions.  One of the mechanisms  expected  proposed  at that time was a
surcharge  on the vehicle  ownership  tax, which  is collected  by the State.
Privatizing  Flumitrens  and Metro
24. The State recognized  early on that it had no comparative  advantage  in running  any of
the transport operating  agencies  and that both Flumitrens  and the Metro should  be
managed  by the private sector.  It agreed  that the concession  to operate the Metro
would  begin  no later than  January  1997  and that the concession  to operate  Flumitrens
would  begin  by January  1998.
25. To make both systems  more  attractive  to the private  sector, the State asked  both
institutions  to begin  downsizing  in order  to increase  the ratio of revenue  passengers  to
staff.  Payroll  cuts of as much  as 50 percent (or concomitant  increases  in revenue
passengers)  were sought.
26. By May 1996  both agencies  had exceeded  the targets set by the government.  The
initial  staff reduction  program  eliminated  1,800  positions  at Flumitrens  and 800
positions  at the Metro. The staff cuts affected  the administrative,  engineering,  and
planning  divisions  of the agencies,  all of which  were greatly  overstaffed.
27. In addition,  the State asked  Flumitrens  to put in place  a fare evasion  control system  to
increase  revenues.  It also  instructed  both Flumitrens  and the Metro to identify  land  and
buildings  that could  be sold  or leased  to increase  non-operating  revenues.
628. The State looked  to the state-owned  subway  system  in Santiago,  Chile,  as a model  for
staffing  the Metro. That system,  which  is about as long as the Rio de Janeiro  system
and carries  almost  twice as many  passengers  at the same  average  tariff,  has registered
an operating  surplus.  For Flumitrens  the State sought  to emulate  the Buenos  Aires'
suburban  rail system,  which  is operated  by private  concessionaires.  That system  enjoys
a productivity  that was, in 1995,  three times as high as that at Flumitrens.
29. To identify  the optimal  type of private  management  for each  company,  the State
conducted  a study  to evaluate  the options  for private  sector participation  in Flumitrens
and the Metro. This study was funded  by an ongoing  Bank loan  which  financed  the
decentralization  of the rail system  from the federal  to the state government.
30. Originally,  the concessions  for Flumitrens  and the Metro had been  expected  to follow
the Argentine  model.  Under  that model,  the government  would  pay the concessionaire
a subsidy,  which  would  decline  over time to zero. (Subsidies  were provided  to
concessionaires  in Buenos Aires  because  the government  reserved  the right  to set
tariffs affordable  to the low-income  population.)  After subsidies  ended, the
concessionare  would pay  the government  an annual  fee. To make the concession
attractive  to potential  investors,  the government  rather than the concessionaire  bore
the cost of the investment  plan,  which  was implemented  by the concessionaire.  The
bidder with the lowest  net present  value of the cost of investment  plan  plus  the subsidy
to be paid  by the government  minus  the concession  fee to be paid by the
concessionaire  would  win the concession.
31. The Argentine  model  is similar  to granting  a long-term  management  contracts  to
operate mass transit  systems.  It differs  from a typical  management  contract,  however,
in that the commercial  risk  lies with the concessionaire  and the concession  term is
generally  longer than the usual management  contract  term. The Argentine  model's
main advantage  is that the concessionaire  must try to comply  with the investment  plan
at the lowest cost and propose  the lowest subsidy  schedule  to win the bid, knowing
full well  that if its net operating  deficit  is less  than the subsidy,  he will be able  to keep
the difference.  Although  the plan  involved  government  financing  of the original
investment  plan, experience  has shown  that after implementing  such plans,
concessionnaires  are willing  to make  their own  investments  in order  to attract more
customers  and increase  revenues  while  decreasing  costs by improving  technology.
32. The US$373 million  investment  plan  proposed  for Flumitrens  was designed  to
rehabilitate  its rolling  stock, signaling  and  telecom  plants, and stations  in order  to
allow  it to accommodate  ridership  of 1 million  passengers  a day by 2000. Funds  were
to be provided  under  the proposed  Rio de Janeiro  Mass Transit  Project,  which  was
being  prepared  by the World  Bank.
33. The Metro had already  secured  the funds  needed  to double  its ridership  and increase
its route length  from 23 to 35 kilometers.  The US$620 million  investment  for the
Metro was financed  by a loan from  Brazil's National  Development  Bank (BNDES).
7The loan was to be used to complete work started more than 10 years ago but halted
because of the State's debt with the Federal Government. This debt had been
pardoned as part of the agreement to decentralize the Flumitrens system from the
Federal to the State.
Privatizing CONERJ
34. The reform program envisioned selling the assets of CONERJ, the ferry boat company,
to the highest bidder. Under the plan, the Secretary of Transport would oversee the
private sector concessionaires who would operate the ferry lines in the Guanabara and
Sepetiba Bays. The State commissioned a valuation study and set a date of November
1997 for completing the sale.
Liquidating CTC and SERVE
35. The reform program envisioned liquidating CTC and SERVE, the state-owned bus
companies. Their assets, mainly buses and garages, were to be sold to the private
sector. The routes operated by the companies would be taken over by private bus
companies, which would be selected through competitive bidding.
Selling Off CODERTE
36. The reform program also envisioned selling CODERTE, the agency in charge of
operating the State's terminals and parking garages. The State commissioned a study
to determine the value of the assets involved, obtain all the legal titles of the
properties, and prepare terms of reference for selling the agency.
Overarching Sector Reforms
37. Before awarding concessions to the private sector in the urban transport sector, it was
important to define a basic sector regulatory framework and the responsibilities  of
each of the urban transport agencies involved. The State created an independent State
Regulatory Commission (ASEP-RJ) which would oversee all the major sectors in the
State, including urban transport. This multisectoral commission does not have a
transport division. It would use a pool of economists, lawyers and other specialists to
deal with all the sectors. Regulation of all modes except buses fall under ASEP-RJ.
The bus lobby was able to veto the inclusion of bus regulation in ASEP-RJ's mandate.
Instead they continued to be regulated by DETRO, an agency of SECTRAN.
38. Finally, the State created a Regional Transport Coordination Commission (AMTU-RJ)
which acts as a policy coordinator for the three levels of government involved in urban
transport, as an adviser on tariff  and subsidy policy and a main forum to discuss and
prioritize the main investments in the RJMR. AMTU-RJ will probably be called upon
to make presentations to ASEP-RJ but will not have regulatory power.
8OUTCOMES OF THE REFORM PROGRAM
39. By 1998, privatization of all of Rio de Janeiro's mass transit systems had been
completed. Concessions for the Metro, Flumitrens, and CONERJ had been awarded,
CTC/SERVE had been liquidated, and CODERTE's main asset had been sold.
The Metro Concession
40. The Metro system was concessioned to the private sector on December 23, 1997.
Two studies were commissioned before the concessions were granted. The first study
examined the basic parameters to be included in the concession bid documents,
analyzed demand of the system under different scenarios, prepared financial
projections, reviewed the legal and institutional framework, and proposed a number of
actions to be considered by the State to deal with redundant Metro staff who would
not be absorbed by the concessionaire. The study, which was financed by the Rio de
Janeiro Metropolitan Transport Decentralization loan and executed by consultants,
also reviewed the impact of the federal concession law on the proposed concession.
41. The financial projections included in the study suggested that that there would be a
period of one to two years during which the system would require an operating
subsidy from the State. This subsidy estimate raised a number of issues because federal
law did not seem to allow for a "negative concession" (one in which the State would
pay subsidies to the concessionaire). The State would have to pass a law to allow for
such subsidies.
42. The second study, financed by the State and carried out by a local consortium, helped
produce the preliminary background memorandum, the cash flow analysis,  the
environmental and safety assessment, the inventory of existing infrastructure and
equipment, and the procurement documents. It also assisted the State in presenting the
concession documents to the public.
43. Despite the consultants' analysis, which showed that there would be at least two years
during which an operating subsidy would be needed, policymakers decided not to offer
subsidies. Several factors influenced their decision. First, the concessionaire would
have no major investment obligations; all investment was to be financed by the State.
Second, the concessionaire would take over all ongoing extensions of the system
financed by the State as well as additional rolling stock already ordered by the State.
Third, the staff cuts assumed by the consultants were considered overly conservative.
The State believed that the concessionaire would reduce staff by more than the
consultants projected. Fourth, tariffs were raised as part of the government's policy of
accounting for inflation.
44. The State also decided to maintain part of the existing Metro organization to handle
issues related to redundant personnel not absorbed by the concessionaire, to assist the
Secretary of Transport with extensions of the system, and to provide support to the
State regulatory agency in monitoring the performance and safety indicators included
in the contract. The State intended to reduce to a minimum  the staff of the residual
9Metro agency  by incorporating  the remaining  staff  in SECTRAN  or ASEP-RJ.
Redundant  staff would  be compensated.
45. The Metro concession  process  resulted  in a number  of interesting  outcomes:
*  The number  of bidders  was high (table  2), a clear indication  that they  were convinced
that they could turn around  a situation  in which  the annual  operating  subsidy  was
about US$109  million.
*  Many  foreign  investors  bid on the concession,  even  though no international  road show
was mounted  to attract interest.
*  The net present  value of the concession  fee of the winning  bid was more than five
times  the minimum  price set in the bidding  documents.  (The main  criticism  from the
political  opposition,  after the concession,  was that the minimum  price set by the State
had been  too low.)
*  There were no official  protests  against  the outcome  of the concession.
*  The consortium  winning  the concession  was led by a foreign  company  (an Argentine
firm  is the operator) and a local  investment  bank.  This shows  that there were no preset
strategy  to favor local  companies.
*  There were no strikes  or destruction  of inventory,  as occurred  in other cases  in which
a state-owned  company  was taken over by the private  sector.
*  The concession  process  was undertaken  in one shot, and initial  legal injunctions
against  the concession  were easily  defeated.
Basic features  of all the concessions  are shown  in Table  4 at the end of the paper.
Table 2. Consortia Biddingfor  the Rio de Janeiro Metro Concession
Company  Bid (in millions of R$)
Opportrans  (Brazilian)  291.6
Cometrans  (Spanish)
Andrade  Gutierrez  (Brazilian)  205.5
Guanabara  Diesel (Brazilian)
CGE A Transport  (French)
RATP (French)
Cascais  Participaq6es  S.A. (Brazilian)  133.7
Bozano Simonsen<(Brazilian)
Metrovias  Argentinas  (Argentine)
Emepa (Argentine)  111.1
MPE (Brazilian)
Note: 1  US$=1.03  R$.
10The Flumitrens Concession
46. The Flumitrens  concession  process  was more complicated  than the concession  for the
Metro. Flumitrens  was seen as a riskier  concession,  and its privatization  was left to the
end of the concession  program. Several  factors  and hasty  decisions  adversely  affected
the process and  forced decision  makers  to rethink  the process  on two occasions.
47. Flumitrens  was transferred  to the State in 1995.  At that time,  it was benefiting  from a
World  Bank loan  that helped  fund  the decentralization  of the system  from the federal
to the State.  Figure  1 explains  this two step process.  The decentralization  was required
by the 1988  Constitution  and the system  could  only  be privatized  by the State. At the
time of the transfer,  the federal  government  agreed  to pay a full year of staff salaries  to
the State, which  was expected  to use the funds  to reduce  redundant  staff.  It was also
expected  that the investments  funded  by the Bank  loan, especially  the rehabilitation  of
the rolling  stock would  allow  Flumitrens  to maintain  its ridership  and prepare  for the
concession.  As a result of several  bad decisions  and delays  in the rehabilitation  of the
trains, however,  train fleet availability  decreased,  passenger  demand  fell,  and fare
evasion  increased.
48. In 1996  the State initiated  a rationalization  program.  Flumitrens  continued  to suffer
from lack  of train availability,  however,  because  the Brazilian  company  that won the
train rehabilitation  contracts  in international  competitive  bidding  did not meet the
proposed schedules.  As a result, ridership  continued  to fall.
49. The Bank  had agreed  to finance  another  loan  to rehabilitate  the remaining  fleet  if the
State would  privatize  Flumitrens.  Rehabilitation  of the infrastructure  and equipment
financed  by the decentralization  loan  plus the additional  rehabilitation  provided  by the
new loan  (Rio de Janeiro  Mass Transit  loan  was expected  to attract private sector
interest  in bidding  for the concession.
Fig. 1 Decentralization  and Concession  of
Flumitrens
. 11 l  I  R  ^  * I  ^ l  _  s  ~~~~~~~~~~~15  Two studies  were commissioned  as part of the concession  process.  The first study,
financed  by the Rio de Janeiro  Metropolitan  Transport  Decentralization  loan  and
executed  by consultants,  examined  the basic  parameters  to be included  in the
concession  bid documents,  estimated  demand  under  different  scenarios,  prepared
financial  projections,  reviewed  the legal and institutional  framework,  and proposed  a
number  of actions  to be considered  by the State  to deal  with redundant  staff  who
would  not be absorbed  by the potential  concessionaire.  The study also reviewed  the
impact  of the federal  concession  law on the proposed  concession.  The study's financial
projections  suggested  that there would  be three to four years during  which  the system
would  require  an operating  subsidy  (of roughly  US$150  million)  from the government
51. The second  study prepared  the preliminary  background  memorandum,  cash flow
analysis,  environmental  and safety  assessment,  inventory  of infrastructure  and
equipment,  and procurement  documents.  The study  was financed  by the State and
conducted  by the same  local consortium  that conducted  the Metro study. In addition,
through  a Bank-administered  grant  from Japan,  funds  were made  available  to
Flumitrens  to hire consultants  to help the State review  the cash flow analysis  and to
mount  a road show  in Miami.  The purpose of that show  would  be to explain  the
process  to potential  concessionaires;  the grant also helped  in funding  procurement
consultants,  and to prepare  the "data room.", i.e., the room where  all the
documentation  prepared  by the State on Flumnitrens  would  be made available  to
potential  bidders.  The main  responsibility  for the preparation  of the procurement
documents  remained  with the consortium  hired  by the State. That consortium  also
helped  the State present  the concession  documents  to the public  (public  audience),  a
step required  by Brazilian  law.
52. The Metro concession,  which  preceded  the Flumitrens  concession,  was a great
success.  However,  the opposition  parties  harshly  criticized  the minimum  price set for
the concession  and accused  the administration  of having  tried to give away  State
property  to the private sector. Sensitive  to these concerns,  State officials  handling  the
Flumitrens  privatization  decided  not to offer an operating  subsidy  as part of the
Flumitrens  concession.  Instead,  State officials  devised  a formula  for providing  the
winning  bidder with funds  for additional  capital  investments  and approving  increases  in
tariffs  if improvements  (such as installation  of air conditioning)  were made to the
trains. It was expected  that such additional  capital  plus  the Bank loan  would  be
sufficient  to attract  private sector interest  in the concession.
53. World  Bank procurement  guidelines  stipulate  that if the bidding  documents  for the
concession  include  the package  of investments  financed  by the Bank and the bidding
process  follows  the Bank's rules on international  competitive  bidding,  the winning
party has the right  to execute  the investment  package  without  further  procurement
(paragraph  3.13 a. of the Bank's procurement  guidelines).  This provision  represented
a great incentive  for the private  sector, because  it ensured  that the investments  that
were still  required,  mainly  train rehabilitation,  could  be implemented  by the
12concessionaire.  Bank  rules required  that concession  procurement  documents  be
approved  by the Bank. This requirement  was agreed  to at the outset and explained  in
detail  to the consultants  who assisted  the State.
54. In December  1997  the State provided  the Bank  with a first draft  of the prequalification
documents  for the Flumitrens  concession.  Review  of the documents  revealed  that
Bank  procurement  guidelines-which, given  the very high  value of the investment
package,  were very strict-had  not been  followed.  The Bank demanded  that changes
be made so that the following  rules  were respected:
Procurement documents must be in English, Spanish, or French. The Bank rejected the
proposal  by the Attorney General's  office  that the official  version  of the documents  be in
Portuguese  (with  an English  translation  provided)  and  that the Portuguese  version  of the
documents  be used in cases  of confiusion  over the meaning  of the translation.
Only member countries of the Bank are eligible to bid on the concession. Bank
procurement  guidelines  permit  only  member  countries  to submit  proposals  for works,
goods, and services  financed  by the Bank. The State argued  that since  the concession
would  last 25 years  while  the Bank-financed  loan  would end  in 5 years, its own rules
should  apply  regarding  which  countries  are eligible  to bid. According  to Brazilian  state
and federal  laws, all countries  with which  Brazil  maintains  friendly  relations,  including  the
Democratic  People's Republic  of Korea and Cuba,  are eligible  to bid on projects.  The
Bank rejected  the State's position.
Bids can be submitted  directly.  The Bank was unwilling  to accept  the process adopted in
the Metro privatization.  In that concession,  each  bidder  was required  to hire a stockbroker
from the Rio de Janeiro  Stock  Exchange  to present  its proposal.  Such a practice  clearly
violated  Bank procurement  rules,  which stipulate  that parties  submitting  proposals  cannot
be prevented  from doing  so directly.  The State argued  that it had been  using the Rio de
Janeiro  Stock  Exchange  for all its privatization  auctions  and that doing so had brought
transparency  to the process.  The Bank  rejected  the State's position.
The standardprocurement  schedule must be  followed.  Bank procurement guidelines
require  that bidders  be given  at least 45 days  for prequalification  plus at least 60 days after
the bidding  documents  are issued.  The State wanted  to shorten  the process  by allowing
only  20 days for prequalification  and issuing  the bidding  documents  before  the results of
the prequalification  were released.  The State argued  that the accelerated  schedule  was
necessary  in order to complete  the process  before the upcoming  elections  for State
governor.  The Bank rejected  the State's position.
The  format  of the bidding documents must conform to Bank guidelines. The format of the
bidding  documents  was not acceptable  to the Bank because  the technical  specifications,
which  should  normally  appear  as annexes  to the bidding  documents,  were part of the
contract.  In a contract  of this size,  the review  committee  would not accept major
deviations  from standard  procedures  for international  competitive  bidding.
1355. The Bank asked the State to resubmit the documents once the changes had been made.
Faced with the choice between meeting Bank procurement guidelines (in order to be
able to include the investment package in the concession bid) and meeting the tight
schedule the State had set for itself, however, the State decide to proceed with the
concession without resubmitting its documents to the Bank. National procurement
rules were thus adopted, and the Bank-financed investment package was not included
as part of the concession bid.
56. Excluding the Bank loan made the concession less attractive to some private investors.
Because the investment package was not included in the concession bid, the package
had to be procured under the traditional procurement process. Under this type of
process, procurement is conducted by the State as it is done in traditional projects, and
companies that do not win the concession may bid on some or all lots. The winning
concessionaire would not be allowed to bid on the package because of conflict of
interest. Because of that, it was feared that civil works contractors and equipment
rehabilitation contractors who were initially very interested in the concession would be
less inclined  to bid.
57. The State administration worked feverishly to prepare the procurement documents
under Brazilian law and called for pre-qualifications. Five consortia indicated that they
would seek pre-qualification. At the last minute, however, only one consortium
appeared ready to present the bid bond required. Suspecting collusion, the State
cancelled the first bid and set a new date for the bidding process.
58. In the meantime, the State included changes in the bidding documents to make the
process even more transparent and to allow time for other bidders to enter. It called
for new pre-qualifications, with the minimum price set at US$28 million plus the cost
of materials Flumitrens held in inventory. The net present value of the bid would
include other than the net present value of the offer above the minimum  price to be
paid over the concession period, the cost assumed by the bidder to repair the rolling
stock fleet listed as optional in the bid (without out-of-pocket payment to Flumitrens)
plus the discount offered on the capital made available by Flumitrens. This capital,
another incentive added by the State, consisted of the receivables from the remaining
fee payments from the Metro concession and were to be used toward rehabilitating the
rest of the train fleet. Providing these funds, which really represented a capital subsidy,
was an ingenious yet risky way of providing capital for rehabilitation. Finally, an
increase in tariffs was allowed if the bidder would equip the trains with air
conditioning within a certain deadline.
59. Five consortia submitted bids for the concession (table 3). The highest price was more
than six times the minimum  price set. The winning proposal was from a Spanish-
Brazilian consortium, which will carry out much of the investment package, including
rehabilitating many trains.
14Table  3. Consortia  Bidding  for the Flumitrens  Concession
Company  Bid (in millions  of R$)
Bolsa 2000 (Brazilian)  279.6
Caf (Spanish)
Rede Nacional De Los Ferrocarriles (Spanish)
Rio Express (Brazilian)  164.7
Andrade Gutierrez
Auto Viacao 1001 (Brazilian)
Opportunity (Brazilian)
RATP (French)




Breda Construziones Ferroviarias (Italian)







60. The concession for CONERJ, the ferry boat company, was won by Andrade Guitierrez
(Brazilian), the only consortium to bid on the project, for the minimum  bid price
(R$28.4 million). The two other prequalified consortia decided not to bid at the last
minute raising accusations of possible collusion and preventing competitive bids. This
incident was a good lesson for the State which became more vigilant during the
Flumitrens concession process. Andrade Guitierrez is also the concessionaire of the
toll bridge (Rio-Niter6i), which is the main link for automobile traffic between the two
sides of the bay.
The CTC/SERVE Liquidation
61. Both CTC and Serve were liquidated and their routes and equipment auctioned to
private sector operators. The move guaranteed that service would be provided by
private operators, which do not receive subsidies from the State.
The CODERTE Sale
62. CODERTE's main asset, its parking garage in downtown Rio de Janeiro was
auctioned for R$80 million.
15LESSONS LEARNED
63. Privatization of the transport sector in Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region represented
a valiant effort by a state administration to increase private sector participation and
reduce subsidies in a sector that had been heavily subsidized. It allowed the State to
get out of a business in which it had no comparative advantage, to depoliticize the
process of appointing directors, and to obviate the need to pay subsidies to expand the
sector.
64. Will the effort lead to better service? All indications are that it will. In the case of the
Metro and CONERJ, the results of privatization are already evident because demand is
up and the level of service offered is better. In the case of Flumitrens, service
improvement will take a bit longer, but it would be very difficult to offer worse service
than that offered by either the federal or the State administration. Operating subsidies
at all the companies have been eliminated. However, there are still high payroll costs at
Metro and Flumitrens because of redundant staff not absorbed by the concessionaires.
If all goes well, the State will probably be able to reduce its payroll costs with the
holding companies to the minimum  required to retain only the crucial personnel for
managing expansion plans and monitor their concessions.
65. The Rio experience highlights the important of having the secretary of planning or
finance rather than the sector secretary lead the privatization effort. In Rio de Janeiro
the reforms were lead by the State Secretary of Planning, Marco Aurelio Alencar, who
championed the program. Alencar made decisions swiftly, and his timing was right
(except in the case of Flumitrens, which should have been privatized earlier). His
leadership and willingness  to listen to comments by the presidents of the operating
agencies and the Secretary of Transportation were invaluable.  He also had full
authority from his father, the State Governor, to take all steps to implement the
program. This certaily reduced the chances of government infighting which is quite
common in privatization processes.
66. What role did the Bank play in the process? The Bank performed a useful function
throughout the process by identifying  the options available and sharing information on
other concession experiences around the world with policymakers. Funding for the
first studies evaluating options for privatizing the systems was provided by the Bank as
part of the financing of the decentralization of the rail system. That loan also allowed
the State to restart the Metro works, which had been halted for almost 10 years.
Preparation of the Rio de Janeiro Mass Transit loan set off the first brainstorming
session with decision-makers about concessions. It also helped attract the attention of
the State's vice-governor, who recognized the need to increase private sector
participation in the sector and to restructure the sector by creating AMTU-RJ. Finally,
during the preparation of the State Reform and Privatization loan the Bank served as a
sounding board and provided multisectoral support by demanding the establishment of
a regulatory agency. That agency will be crucial in resolving disputes and monitoring
the concessions.
1667. Lessons can be learned  from the problems  encountered  in Rio de Janeiro.  The
scheduling  of the Flumitrens  privatization  and the State's decision  to hire the same
consultant  for the Metro and Flumitrens  concessions  slowed  the process  because  the
consultant  was unable  to deal  with both concessions  at the same  time.  Better
knowledge  of Bank  guidelines  could also have  saved some  time and aggravation.
68. The State's project  team found the Bank's procurement  guidelines  too inflexible.  They
argued  that the Bank  could have  accommodated  some  deviation  from its procurement
guidelines  because  the Flumitrens  concession  was not a typical  project and the Bank's
procurement  guidelines  are not adapted  for concession  procurement.  The Bank's
guidelines  could  probably  have  been  followed.  However,  the need  to complete  the
concession before the election  meant  that the State lacked  the time needed  to meet the
Bank's guidelines.  Despite  the fact  that those guidelines  were not followed,  the
process  appears  to have  been  transparent,  as the postponement  of the first Flumitrens
prequalification  bidding  shows.
69. The Rio de Janeiro  experience  suggests  that even  in systems  experiencing  very high
deficits  as a result of inefficient  management,  inadequate  infrastructure,  and inferior
equipment,  concessions  can be designed  that attract the private  sector. Unlike  Buenos
Aires,  the State of Rio de Janeiro  was able  to privatize  its urban transport systems
without  providing  operating  subsidies.  This major achievement  must be attributed  to
the stand  taken by the Secretary  of Planning,  who believed  that the private sector
would  be willing  to take over the systems  even  if they expected  to experience
operating  deficits  in the first  few years.
70. Why was it possible  to grant  these concessions  in Rio de Janeiro?  Why have other
cities  not been  able to do so as quickly?  Several  factors  seem  to have  been at work:
*  Operating  deficits  in Rio de Janeiro  were as high as 8 -10 percent of State revenue.
These deficits  made  it difficult  for the political  opposition  to oppose  privatization.
*  Rio found a "champion"  for the privatization  who was determined  to overcome  all
obstacles  to divestiture.  His excellent  legal  team successfully  fought  off all legal
injunctions.
*  The process  was transparent.  Use of the Rio Stock  Exchange  to present  and evaluate
bids was unacceptable  under  Bank  procurement  guidelines.  But in Brazil, doing  so,
added  to the project's transparency.
*  The Rio State team was very careful  to prevent  collusion  among  bidders.  When  they
suspected  collusion,  they simply  delayed  the process and provided  time for other
bidders  to join the process. (Despite  these efforts, only  one consortium  bid on the
CONERJ  concession.)
17*  Despite their operating deficits, both the Metro and Flumitrens had tremendous
potential because of their comparative advantages over competing transportation
modes.
*  The process was managed by the Secretary of Planning and the Secretary of Finance
rather than the Secretary of Transport. This helped prevent operating agencies and
transportation lobbies, which have close ties to SECTRAN, from sabotaging the
reform effort.
NEXT STEPS
71. Privatizing urban transit in Rio de Janeiro should raise the level of service, thereby
benefiting the low-income residents who are the system's main users. Improvement of
service at a tariff that can be borne by low-income residents should be the yardstick by
which the success of the effort is measured.
72. The challenge for the next administration will be to ensure that true modal integration
takes place. Creating a multimodal ticket will require introduction of special ticketing,
such as the smart card, and an agreement on revenue sharing through some sort of
clearinghouse. The State must coordinate and regulate the sector.
73. Since the State and municipal administrations belong to different political parties, care
must be exercised to ensure that municipal buses do not engage in predatory pricing.
Tariffs of intermunicipal buses cannot be set at levels that will hurt the Flumitrens
concessionaire. Proposals to impose a flat fare for both urban and intermunicipal
buses, for example, could have a very detrimental effect on Flumitrens. ASEP-RJ must
also be very strict in ensuring that the concessionaires comply with the performance
targets included in the contracts.
74. The State had planned to eliminate  redundant staff through voluntary and involuntary
staff reduction programs. During the preparation of the reforms, the State indicated
that it had access to a credit line with the federal savings and loan (Caixa Economica
Federal) to finance the severance payments of staff not kept on by the concessionaires.
Unfortunately, this effort was only partially accomplished, and the number of
redundant staff is much higher than expected. Nine months after the concessions, when
this paper was written, there were close to 3000 redundant staff (2500 from
Flumitrens and 500 from Metro), at a monthly cost of  US$6.3 million.  Not having
made the adequate provisions for severance payments to this staff was a major flaw in
this process, and the State must quickly take steps to correct this failure. To take
advantage of the savings provided by the concession, the State must either reallocate
the redundant personnel to other agencies where they might be needed or find the
additional funds to make the severance payments. Without these actions, the
concessions will not produce the savings expected.
I8Table 4- URBAN  TRANSPORT  CONCESSIONS  IN THE RIO DE  JANEIRO  METROPOLITAN  REGION
METRO  FLUMITRENS  CONERJ  CODERTE
PACKAGE  SIZE  41 km  right  of way  extension  200  km right  of way  extension  10 different  sea-  routes  One  urban  terminal  -
Menezes  Cortes-
TERM  OF  THE  20 years,  renewable,  only  once,  for  25 years,  renewable,  only  once,  for  25 years,  renewable,  only  once,  for  more  .sale
CONCESSION  more  20  years.  more  25  years.  25 years.
OWNERSHIP  Rio  de  Janeiro  State  Govemment  Rio  de Janeiro  State  Govemment  Rio  de Janeiro  State  Govemment  Rio  de Janeiro  State
Govemment
QUALITY  SERVICE  According  to  the  perfornance  targets  According  to the  performance  targets  According  to the  performance  targets  for  NA
SPECIFICATION  for frequency,  reliability,  safety  and  for frequency,  reliability,  safety  and  frequency,  reliability,  safety  and  comfort
(in annex)  comfort  established  in the  comfort  established  in the  established  in  the  Concession  Contract
Concession  Contract.  Concession  Contract
PAYMENTS  There  are  no payments  by  the  There  are no  payments  by  the  There  are  no payments  by  the  NA
(BY  THE  Govemment.  Govemment.  Proceeds  of METRO  Govemment.
GOVERNMENT)  concession  fee  made  available  for
investments
AWARD  CRITERIA  Net Present  Value  of Best  Offer  Net  Present  Value  of Best  Offer  Net  Present  Value  of Best  Offer  above  Highest  bid above  minimum
above  the  Minimum  Price  (MP)  plus  above  the  Minimum  Price  (MP)  plus  the  Minimum  Price  (MP):  price.  Sale  by  auction  with  a
materials  in stock  (UM)  materials  in stock(UM);MP:  R$  28m;  -100%  of  the  ordinary  shares:  R$28.4m  minimum  price  R$80m
MP: R$  25m;  UM: R$  3.56m  UM: R$  8.25m  plus  (MP);  90%  for  the  new  control  group  and
Discount  on  capital  made  available  by  1  0%  for  employees.
State;  plus cost  of optional  Selctive  lines:  refrigeration,  higher
investments  assumed  by  the  bidder  speed  and  more  comfort.  Term:  Charitas
- Niter6l(1  0 months); Pra9a XV - Barra
(36  months);  Rio  - Sbo  Goncalo  (24
months)
TARIFF  Single  Tariff  for  one-way  trip  was  set  Single  Tariff  for  one-way  trip  was  set  Single  Tariff  for  one-way  trip was  set by
RENEGOTIATION  by  State  in the  bidding  documents  by  State  In  the  bidding  documents  State  in the  bidding  documents  and  can
CONDITIONS  and  can  only  be  updated  for inflation  and  can  only  be updated  for inflation  only  be  updated  for inflation  according  to
according  to formula.  For  expansion  according  to formula  The  formula.Special  line  for  vehicles
and  new  investments  in the  present  Concessionaire  will  be  allowed  to  transportation  (Ferryboat):  R$  6.6m(MP)
contract,  the  Concessionaire  must  collect  a higher  tariff  (50%),  If he  - only  In  case  of Implantation.
submit  a plan  for  the  State  installs  air conditioning  systems  in
Govemment  approval.  the  trains,  according  to the  Contract.
For  expansion  and  new  investments
in the  present  contract,  the
Concessionaire  must  submit  a plan
for the State Govemment  approval.
PERFORMANCE  According  to the  Concession  According  to  the  Concession  According  to  the  Concession  Contract
ASSURANCE  Contract  under  the  supervision  of  Contract  under  the  supervision  of  under  the  supervision  of ASEP-RJ
ASEP-RJ  (Public  Services  ASEP-RJ  (Public  Services  (Public  Services  Regulatory  Agency  of
Regulatory  Agency  of the  Rio  the  Regulatory  Agency  of the  Rio  the  the Rio  the  Janeiro  State)
Janeiro  State)  Janeiro  State)
NETWORK  The  State  vill establish  the  conditions The  State  will  establish  the  The  Concessionaire  may  participate,
PLANNING  for  operations  of new  lines.  conditions  for  operation  of new  lines.  when  Invited,  of  planning  studies  in
charge  of the  State Govermment.
ACCESS  TO  The  Concessionaire  of  the  freight
FACILITIES  railway  system  has  access  to
FLUMITRENS  lnes  and  pays  a track right.Table  5- LEVEL-OF-SERVICE  SPECIFICATIONS
FLUMITRENS
The Concession  Contract  establishes  the following  performance  indicators  as well as the formula  to calculate  them and the penalties  for non compliance  with such indicators:
IRI- compliance  with scheduled  service  at peaks(regulanty)  defined  as the ratio between  adequate  intervals  between  trains and the total number  of intervals between  trains; the
time of day to estimate  this indicator  are daily peak periods,  in extreme  and center points of a railway line.  Formula  : IRI=(Qa/Qt)  x 100 where Qa is the quantity  of adequate
intervals  between actual  trains in the period  under  observation  and Qt is the total quantity  of intervals  between  actual  trains in that spot of the line and during  the observation
period.  An adequate  interval  is one that is within  plus  or minus 20% of the programmed  interval.
IPO-punctuality  indicator-  ratio  between  trains on schedule  (Th) and total number  of trains during  the observation  period  (Tr);Formula:  (Th/Tr)  x 100
ICO-Supply  compliance  Indicator,  ratio between  number  of actual  trips (Vr) and number  of programmed  trips during  the observation  period  (Vp);  formula  (Vr/Vp) x 100
MKBF-million  kilometers  between  failures  (MKBF).
It also includes
-summary  table of operational  parameters;
-acceptable  waiting  times for  omnibus  trains in all stations  included  in specified  lines, for  peak and off-peak  periods.
METRO
The Concession  Contract  establishes  the following  parameters  to evaluate  the quality  of the level-of-service  offered:  service  parameters  and performance  parameters:




ION- notable  occurrence  indicator,  ratio between  number  of notable occurrences  (On)  which caused  delays  of 5 minutes  or more in train departures  and the maximum  number
(Om) of acceptable  notable occurrences  (5) during  the observation  period; Formula:  (On/Om)  x 100
ICD-composite  performance  indicator,  ICD=ICO+IR-(0.2  X ION)
CONERJ
The concession  contract  includes  indicators  which cover  efficiency,  regularity,  continuity,  safety,  courtesy  to users.
20ANNEX 1
SECTRAN and Its Agencies
1.  Since  most of the urban  transport component  deals  with the  agencies  which  are
subordinated  to the Secretary  of Transport  of RJ (SECTRAN),  a summary  description  of
those agencies  and of SECTRAN  is provided  in the next  paragraphs  and summarized  in
Table 1.
2.  SECTRAN is responsible  for policy  setting, regulation  and supervision  of all
public  and freight  transport in the State  which  crosses  municipal  boundaries.  In addition,
it is also  responsible  for rail suburban  transport  in the RJMR,  ferry boat services  in the
Guanabara, Sepetiba  and  Ilha Grande  bays,  and for the Rio de Janeiro  Metro. SECTRAN
has a staff of 330 employees  (166 in the operational  areas  and 164 in administrative
functions) and is organized  as a traditional  transport ministry  with departments  dealing
with Passenger  Transport,  Freight  Transport,  Special  Projects, Transport  Engineering  and
General  Administration  in addition  to divisions  in charge  of technical  and legal support  to
the Secretary  and the Undersecretary.  SECTRAN  is not responsible  for road infrastructure
which  is under the Secretary  of Public Works. The main  agencies  subordinated  to
SECTRAN are:  a) Companhia  Fluminense  de Trens  Urbanos  (Flumitrens  ); b)
Companhia  do Metropolitano  do Rio de Janeiro  (Metro);  c) Companhia  de Navegarao do
Estado do Rio de Janeiro  (CONERJ);  Companhia  de Desenvolvimento  Rodoviario  e
Terminais  (CODERTE);  Companhia  de Transportes  Coletivos  do Estado do Rio de
Janeiro  (CTC);  Empresa  Estadual  de Viacao  (SERVE);  Departamento  de Transportes
Rodoviarios  do Estado do Rio de Janeiro  (DETRO).  At the end of 1995, SECTRAN  and
its agencies  had a total staff of 15,942  employees  of which 4,218 in administrative
functions  and 11,724  in operating  functions.  SECTRAN  and its agencies  received
subsidies  totaling R$3  56.11 (US$ 371 million)  in 1995.
3.  Flumitrens  , the suburban  rail company was, until  December  1994,  part of the
federally-owned  Companhia  Brasileira de Trens  Urbanos.  In a Bank financed
decentralization  program (Ln. 3633-BR),  the Federal  Government agreed  with the State
that in return for investing  US$272  million (of which  the Bank loan amounted  to
US$128.5)  in infrastructure  and equipment  of the system, the State would  assume  the
operational  and financial  responsibility  of Flumitrens free of debt and would  receive  all
the assets of the company  including  land  and terminals  needed  f or operational  purposes.
The State saw in this decentralization  program  an opportunity  to better run the suburban
rail system,  to be more responsive  to the users, and to improve  integration  with the bus,
subway  and ferry system  all  under its jurisdiction.  As part of the agreement  to receive  the
Flumitrens  system,  the State had reached  an agreement  for the Municipality  of Rio de
Janeiro  (RJM)  to take over the Metro. After  two years  of protracted  negotiations,  RJM
decided  not to take over the Metro. The State had, at that time to decide  whether  to
assume  Flumitrens  and continue  with the Metro or to withdraw  from the decentralization
program. Since  as part of the decentralization  program, the Federal  Government  would
also absorb  a US$ 2.8 billion  debt of the Metro with the Federal  Government,  that wouldallow the State to restart the Metro works which had been halted in the last ten years  as
well as it would unblock other federal funding to the State,  the latter decided  to continue
with the decentralization program. The long  negotiations between the State and RJM,
resulted in implementation delays of Ln. 3633-BR which affected the overall performance
of Flumitrens,  particularly the condition of the train fleet which deteriorated very fast.
The working subsidy estimated at appraisal for 1994 was around  US$80 million while
the actual subsidy paid by the Federal Government at that time was US$160 million, i.e.,
twice as much, mainly due to a drop in demand caused by very poor train availability and
very high fare evasion.  To compensate for this deviation, the Federal Government agreed
to meet a full year of payroll after decentralization (1995) to give time to the State to
restructure the system. However, during 1995, salary increases stipulated by federal
legislation combined with further deterioration of the train fleet and slow restructuring,
increased the 1995 subsidy to us$188 million. In fact, 1996 is the first fiscal year in which
the State is going to meet the payroll of Flumitrens. During the mid-term review of
Ln.3633-BR,  agreement has been reached in re-allocating more funds for train
rehabilitation and decrease the amounts spent in station rehabilitation. This would bring
the ridership to close to 900,000 passengers per day at  the end of the project instead of
the projected 1.1 million forecast at appraisal. It is estimated, however, that a further
investment of US$ 373 million  will be needed to bring Flumitrens infrastructure and
equipment to a standard which is  attractive to private concessionaires and capable of
serving 1.28 million passengers/day. This additional investment is essentially (about 80%)
for train rehabilitation.
4.  Flumitrens had at the end of 1995 (i.e. at the end of the first year under the State),
7871 employees of which 826 in administration and 7045 in operations. The tariff charged
by the system in 1995 was US$0.42,  much less than the competing  intermunicipal  buses
(US$1.35). Most of the users are low-income (1-2 minimum salaries/month) and therefore
the government is reluctant to raise the tariff which is traditionally set at 90% of the
municipal bus fare. Despite their low income, surveys show that users are willing to pay
more if the service becomes more reliable and frequent and that can only  be achieved
when the train fleet is rehabilitated. The State has decided that,  as part of  a program to
reduce Flumitrens subsidy, it will call for bids for a long-term  concession of the system to
a private sector concessionaire which will operate and maintain the system at the lowest
net present value of cost to the Government over the period of concession. In the
meantime it is expected that the investments under Ln. 3633-BR plus investments to
decrease the maintenance backlog will improve train availability  . Furthermore, the State
has asked the Bank to evaluate a  loan to finance the additional US$373 million estimated
to bring the system to a condition which will make it more attractive to potential private
sector concessionaires.
5.  Flumitrens  employees contribute to a  federal railway fund (REFER) which
complements the social security pensions to which they are entitled. The ongoing staff
downsizing program in Flumitrens and the Metro  is likely to affect REFER's capacity to
repay its members since the laid off employees are entitled to withdraw their contributions.
226.  Flumitrens 's subsidy per passenger in 1994 was US$1.558 while in Argentina the
privately run suburban rail system of Buenos Aires is US$0.32. The subsidy per car-km
supplied by  Flumitrens is US$5.03 while in Buenos Aires was US$1.03. Finally, paying
passengers per staff in Flumitrens were 12488 while in Buenos Aires were 42860. These
comparisons are only  to suggest  that restructuring of  Flumitrens through concessions
may boost productivity and drastically reduce the subsidy per passenger.
7.  Metro operated only 2 lines one of 11.6 km  and 15 stations and another with 11.4
km and 7 stations for a total of 23km and  22 stations. Metro was always under the State
responsibility and its works have been halted since the beginning of the previous
administration due to the inability  of the State to pay the debt service owed to the Federal
Government. At the end of  1995, Metro had 3272 employees of which 1842 in operations
and 1430 in administrative functions. This compares with the Santiago do Chile Metro
which with the same length operates with only 1300 employees and,  with the same tariff
as the Metro (US$0.45) covers all its costs.  Metro received a subsidy of  R$109 million
(US$ 113.5 million) in 1995 and transported 73.1 million passengers. This subsidy is
expected to increase to US$120 million inl996  if the system is not restructured.  In
1995, Metro's  subsidy per paying passenger was us$1.34 and the subsidy per car-km
supplied was us$12.21 compared respectively us$0.08 and us$0.60 in the Buenos Aires
subway under private concession. The State was able to secure a BNDES loan of
US$298 million  which together with State funds of US$322  will allow Metro to extend
its system to 3 5 km and finish works which had been halted  since 1990. With these
investments, Metro expects to double its ridership to approximately  1 million passengers
/day ,and decrease its very high subsidy. The State has also decided to have Metro
managed by a  private management and  later on by a concession as in Buenos Aires and
intends to bring its subsidy to zero by the end of 1998.
8.  CONERJ  operates the ferryboat system between Rio /Niter6i , Rio/Paqueta and
Rio/Ribeira in  the Guanabara Bay  and the route between Mangaratiba/Abraao/ Angra
dos Reis  in the Sepetiba Bay. CONERJ also administers and operates the Ferry Terminals
of  Praca XV in Rio, Niter6i, Paqueta, Ribeira, and also the docking quays in
Mangaratiba, Abraao and Angra dos Reis. CONERJ  has 19 ferries of which eleven have a
2000 passenger capacity, four have a capacity of 1000, two of 500,  two of 370 and 3
support vessels. In 1995 , CONERJ had 1097 employees of which 381 were in
administrative functions and 716 in operating functions. Most of the passengers (93%) are
carried in the Rio (Pra,a XV) -Niter6i link which at peak  hours offers a  15 minute
headway  service for a 5 km (20 minute) crossing. CONERJ transported roughly 24
million passengers per year and in 1995 had a subsidy of  R$29.64  (US$30.875) which
gives a subsidy per passenger of  R$1.2 (US$ 1.286) per passenger. RJ intends to sell the
assets of CONERJ and concession out its present lines to the private sector.
9.  CTC ISERVE were bus companies which operate in the municipalities of Rio de
Janeiro, Niter6i, Sao Gongalo  e Campos  providing  intermunicipal  services  and integrated
services with other modes. CTC also operates in the Santa Teresa neighborhood of Rio
where it operates the tramways (bondinho). CTC/SERVE operate a total of 26  bus routes
and 2 tramway  routes. They  have  a fleet of 369 buses of which 117  are fueled  by gas, 50
23are articulated  diesel-fueled  buses  and 142  are standard  diesel  buses  with more  than 7
years.  In 1995, CTC/SERVE had a total of 2496 employees  of which 1048  in
administrative  functions  and 1448  in operating  functions.  CTC/SERVE  staffing per bus is
much  higher  than that of its private  sector competitors  who do not receive  subsidies.
CTC/SERVE  transported  26.6 million  passengers  in 1995  and received  subsidies  which
amounted  to R$36.79  (US$38.32) or a subsidy  of US$1.441  per passenger  carried.  The
State has decided  to sell CTC/SERVE  assets and concession  out its lines  to the private
sector operators.
10.  CODERTE  owns 18 road terminals,  2 garage  buildings  in Rio, 12 parking  lots
located  in several  municipalities,  in addition  to shops,  rooms  and commercial  real  estate
totaling  200 properties.  The road terminals  of  Novo Rio and  Roberto da Silveira  are
privately  managed.  At the end of 1995, CODERTE  had 695  employees  of which  306 in
administrative  functions  and 389 in operating  functions.  In 1995, CODERTE  turned an
operating  profit of R$1.21 million  (US$1.26  million).  The State feels  that CODERTE
could  be much more profitable  and  therefore  it plans  to increase  private  sector
participation  in the management  of CODERTE's  properties  and to sell  some of the assets
to the private sector.
11.  DETRO is the agency  in charge  of regulation  of the intermunicipal  bus system in
the State. There are two types of services  regulated  by DETRO:  a) the urban services
which use vehicles with two doors, common seats, turnstiles, and can circulate with
standing passengers and b) the intercity services  whose buses have reclining seats and
which can not circulate  with standing  passengers. In 1995  there were 106 licensed  bus
companies  regulated by DETRO. DETRO's functions are to  regulate entry/exit, tariff
setting, enforce  safety and monitor compliance  with agreed  level-of-service.  DETRO had
178 employees  in  1995 of which 63 in administrative  functions and 115 in operating
functions.  DETRO turned an operating  profit of R$3.48 million  (US$3.625  million)  . The
State will have to continue  to regulate  buses and most likely  DETRO will continue  with
SECTRAN.  It is also expected  that the intermunicipal  bus regulatory  framework  will be
revamped  and adapted  to take into account  the recently  approved  concessions  law.
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